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Witness Preparation: Regulating the
Profession's'Dirty Little Secret'
by ROBERTA K. FLOWERS*
Every day in courthouses and attorneys' offices across the nation,
both prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys interview witnesses
for the purpose of preparing them to testify at hearings, depositions,
and trials. Witness preparation2 is considered by most criminal
* William Reece Smith, Jr. Distiguished Professor, Stetson University College of
Law. Professor Flowers began her career as a state prosecutor in Colorado and then a
federal prosecutor in Miami. Professor Flowers wishes to thank Meghan Ready and
Shannon Strasser for their excellent research assistance.
1. I first noted this description of witness preparation in Roberta K. Flowers, What
You See is What you Get: Applying the Appearance of Impropriety Standard to Prosecutor,
63 Mo. L. REV. 699 (1998). See Jeffrey L. Kestler, Questioning Techniques And Tactics
9.04, at 494 (2d ed. 1992) (noting that "there is nothing dirty about witness preparation,"
but acknowledging that routinely lawyers must convince witnesses that there is nothing
unethical about the procedure); Bennett L. Gershman, Witness Coaching by Prosecutors,
23 CARDoZO L. REV. 829, 829 (2002) (witness coaching is described as being the dark or
dirty secret of the U.S. justice system); Bennett L. Gershman, How Juries Get it Wrong-
Anatomy of the Detroit Terror Case, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 327, 349 (2005); Liisa Rende
Salmi, Don't Walk the Line: Ethical Considerations in Preparing Witnesses for Deposition
and Trial, 18 Rev. Litig. 135, 136 (witness preparation is the dark secret). See also John S.
Applegate, Witness Preparation, 68 TEx. L. REV. 277, 309 (1989) (wherein witness
preparation was called the professions "dark little secret").
2. Here, witness preparation refers to the method used by a lawyer to discuss the
witness's actual testimony prior to their testimony. Some practitioners call this process
"horse shedding" or "wood shedding," referring to the historical use of carriage houses
behind the courthouse for last minute witness preparation. See JAMES W. MCELHANEY,
TRIAL NOTEBOOK 50 (3d ed. 1994); State v. Earp, 571 A.2d 1227, 1234-35 (Md. 1990);
Felicia Carter, Court Order Violations, Witness Coaching, and Obstructing Access to
Witnesses: An Examination of the Unethical Attorney Conduct that Nearly Derailed the
Moussaoui Trial, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 463, 468-69 (2007). Witness preparation is
distinguished from investigation and discovery. During the investigation and discovery
stage of the case, the lawyer is gathering facts and determining the strategy of the case. By
the time the lawyer is at the pre-trial witness preparation stage, he should know all the
facts of the case better than all the witnesses and should have determined his trial strategy
and theory. See Flowers, supra note 1; Roberto Aron & Jonathan L. Rosner, How to
Prepare Witnesses for Trials 12.01, at 212-13 (1985) (Professors Aron and Rosner divide
preparation into three stages: the preliminary interview, preparation session, and the
rehearsal session).
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attorneys3-prosecutor and criminal defense attorneys alike-to be
an essential part of trial advocacy. Most American lawyers would
laugh at the suggestion that witness preparation should be
prohibited.4 American lawyers' assert that witness preparation is an
essential step in zealous representation.' This paper addresses the
ethical restraints on this common practice. It will look at whether the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and/or the proposed
ABA Criminal Justice Standards give sufficient regulation and
guidance. It will then suggest several factual scenarios where the
3. References to criminal attorney throughout this paper will include both
prosecutors and defense attorneys.
4. Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1136 ("[O]ur system
of presenting evidence at trial presupposes advance preparation."); Janeen Kerper,
Preparing a Witness for Deposition, 24 Litigation at 11 (1998) (witness preparation is a
tradition in the U.S.). See also Riboni v. District Court, 586 P.2d 9, 11 (Colo. 1978)
(recognizing that that the America criminal justice system requires witness preparation).
5. Although witness preparation is an expected, widespread practice in the United
States, it is not an accepted practice throughout the world. In many countries, the trial
attorney never speaks to the witnesses. See William T. Pizzi & Walter Perron, Crime
Victims in German Courtrooms: A Comparative Perspective on American Problems, 32
STAN. J. INT'L L. 37, 43 (1996) (comparing the American system with the system in
Germany, where the "shaping of witness testimony" is considered unethical). In
discussing the English system of witness preparation, Barrister Michael Hill states that the
reason for the English rule prohibiting barristers from preparing witnesses before trial is
to ensure that the witness's testimony is the "testimony of the witness and not the result of
the advocate's interrogation of the witness in circumstances in which the witness is liable
to seek to adopt the advocate's perception of the events rather than his own recollection."
Michael Hill, Rules of Conduct for Counsel and Judges: A Panel Discussion on English and
American Practices, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 865, 869 (1994). See generally DAVID
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988) (contrasting the German
system which discourages contact between the witness and attorney); R. Doak Bishop &
Brian J. Hurst, Strategic Considerations When Representing Clients in International
Litigation, 2001 BUS. L. INT'L 69, 69-70 (2001) (in many counties it is improper for lawyers
to talk to witnesses before testifying); Elaine Lewis, Witness Preparation: What Is Ethical,
and What Is Not, 36 No. 2 Litigation at 41-42 (2010) (many foreign countries have banned
witness preparation); Kerper, supra note 4, at 11 (witness preparation is a tradition in the
U.S.).
6. Applegate, supra note 1. See Riboni, 596 P.2d at 11 (acknowledging the
prosecution's duty to prepare witnesses); Salmi, supra note 1, at 136-37 (a lawyer who
does not prepare his witness would be derelict; avoiding perjury and representing a client
zealously is a fine line in witness preparation); Nicole LeGrande & Kathleen E. Mierau,
Witness Preparation and the Trial Consulting Industry, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 947, 950
(2004); Lester Brickman, On the Theory Class's Theories of Asbestos Litigation: The
Disconnect Between Scholarship and Reality, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 33, 145 (2003) (some
suggest that witness preparation is required to be a zealous attorney); Hall v. Clifton
Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 528 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (implying that an attorney has the right and
the duty to prepare a client for deposition). See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.3 (1996) (requiring that an attorney act with "reasonable diligence" in
representing a client).
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current standards and rules give very little guidance. Finally, this
paper proposes two standards that might provide some guidance in
this important area of trial preparation that is routinely practiced,
hidden from view, and many times difficult to expose.
I. Witness Preparation Practiced Daily, Rarely Talked About
Although witness preparation is an accepted practice in criminal
law, some worry that what occurs in witness preparation may be
harmful to the search for truth. Professor David Luban observed:
"[T]he interviewing and preparation of witnesses .. . is a practice that,
more than almost anything else gives trial lawyers their reputation as
purveyors of falsehoods."' This perception is due in large part to the
fact that witness preparation routinely takes place in private.
Therefore, many of the ethical issues that might arise within the
context of witness preparation are seldom litigated. The fine line
between proper witness "preparation" and improper witness
manipulation and intimidation-sometimes called witness
"coaching"-is rarely disciplined or even detected.! The majority of
cases dealing with witness preparation address overt attempts to
suborn perjury'0 or the failure of the prosecutor to turn over
inconsistent prior statements of the witness.n The difficult issues
arise in the non-overt actions by the criminal attorney, when the
attorney does not believe that what he is doing is suborning perjury
7. See Gershman, Witness Coaching by Prosecutors, supra note 1, at 851-53 (2002) (a
good discussion of methods that can be used to detect improper witness coaching). See
also In re Cendant Corp. Securities Litig., 343 F. 3d 658 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding that witness
preparation was privileged under the work product doctrine); Richard C. Wydick, The
Ethics of Witness Coaching, 17 CARDOZO L REV. 1, 23 (1995) (discusses many reasons
why witness preparation is difficult to expose); LeGrande & Mierau supra note 6, at 947
(improper witness coaching is difficult to detect).
8. Luban, supra note 5, at 96. See Applegate, supra note 1, at 279.
9. See Michael Higgins, Fine Line, 84 A.B.A. J. 52, 52-53 (May 1998) (quoting
Stephen Gillers' observation that "charges of unethical witness coaching and suborning of
perjury are extraordinarily difficult to prove"); Gershman, Witness Coaching by
Prosecutors, supra note 1, at 829-830 (witness preparation is usually conducted in private
and cross-examination may not expose the improper behavior).
10. See Joseph D. Piorkowski, Jr., Professional Conduct and the Preparation of
Witnesses for Trial: Defining the Acceptable Limitations of "Coaching," 1 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 389, 393 (1987); Salmi, supra note 1, at 137 (it is obvious to most attorneys to
avoid suborning perjury when preparing a witness).
11. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995); Walker v. City of New York, 974 F. 2d
293 (2d Cir. 1992); Gershman, Witness Coaching by Prosecutors, supra note 1, at 834-837.
For a full discussion of these two cases see State v. Campbell, 23 P.3d 176 (Kan. App.
2001) (misconduct to fail to disclose a prior inconsistent statement to the defense).
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but rather merely improving truthful testimony. There is a
considerable ambiguity in the boundary between permissible witness
"preparation" and impermissible witness "coaching.""
In Geders v. United States,3 the Supreme Court acknowledged
that a lawyer is ethically prohibited from improperly influencing
witness testimony, but failed to define what constitutes improper
influence. 4 The Supreme Court recognized that the rules providing
for witness sequestration were adopted, in part, to prevent "improper
attempts to influence the testimony in light of the testimony already
given."" However, the Court found that improper witness coaching
should be defined by the disciplinary rules that govern false
evidence."
H. ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Regulate
False Testimony
Even though the Supreme Court in Geders referred to the
disciplinary rules, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(hereafter referred to as the ABA Rules) do not specifically address
witness preparation." ABA Rule 1.1 defines competent
representation to include "legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."" However,
12. See Michael Higgins, Fine Line, A.B.A. J., at 52-53 (noting that "the line where
legitimate witness preparation crosses into unethical coaching is fuzzy"). See also
Gershman, Witness Coaching by Prosecutors, supra note 1, at 831; Michael S. Ross, Ethical
Issues in Removal Proceedings, 190 PLI/NY 121, 139 (2009) (quoting Knox v. Hayes, 933
F. Supp. 1573, 1582 (S.D.Ga 1995) ("the line between advocacy and falsehood is blurry").
13. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
14. Id. at 80; Piorkowski supra note 10, at 87 (a lawyer's duty as an officer of the court
prevents them from improperly influencing testimony but states that what is unacceptable
influencing testimony is not clearly defined).
15. Id. at 87.
16. See id. at 90 n.3. See Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 281-282 (1989) (stating
sequestration prevents the witnesses' testimony from being influenced by other witnesses'
testimony).
17. Peter J. Henning, The Pitfalls of Dealing with Witnesses in Public Corruption
Prosecutions, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 351, 368 (2010) ("The professional responsibility
rules put the onus on the individual lawyer to decide what to do, and there is no set of
guidelines that can be provided for judging how far witness preparation can go or to say
when testimony crosses the line into falsity and perhaps even perjury. It is ultimately the
lawyer's personal sense of propriety-the individual's moral compass-that will determine
what is appropriate."). LeGrande & Mierau supra note 6, at 947 (2004) ("the United
States judiciary and the ABA have ... avoided the topic of witness preparation.").
18. A.B.A. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002) [hereinafter "MODEL
RULES"].
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the rule does not define the proper preparation of witnesses. It
merely requires "inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal
elements of the problem and use of methods and procedures meeting
the standards of competent practitioners."'9 A question then arises
among practitioners: What is proper witness preparation and what is
improper witness coaching?20
The ABA Rules prohibit certain witness testimony that could in
fact be the product of improper coaching. The ABA Rules strictly
prohibit the lawyer from knowingly offering false or perjurious
testimony.21 Additionally, the ABA Rules require that if a lawyer
subsequently discovers that information offered to a tribunal is false,
he must correct the false information.22 Further, the ABA Rules
prohibit conduct that involves "dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation." 23
ABA Rule 3.3 requires that the attorney "know" that he is
offering false testimony. The term is defined as "actual knowledge of
the fact in question." 24 However the Supreme Court and the ABA
Rules are not helpful in determining how much information is
sufficient to satisfy this knowledge requirement. 25 The definition of
"knowledge" has been debated predominately in the area of
defendant's intended perjury. The definition of "knowingly" has run
the gambit from a requirement that the attorney knows beyond a
reasonable doubt,26 to a requirement that the attorney have a firm
19. MODEL RULES, supra note 18, at R. 1.1 cmt. (2002).
20. Robert S. Thompson, Decision, Disciplined Inferences and the Adversary Process,
13 CARDOZO L. REV. 725, 770 (1991) (finding the line between witness preparation and
witness coaching both "fuzzy and shifting"); Piorkowski, supra note 10, at 390 (discusses
three gray areas of witness preparation); Carter supra note 2, at 469 (the line between
witness preparation and witness coaching is not a "bright line" rule).
21. MODEL RULES, supra note 18, at R. 3.3(a)(2) and R. 3.4 (2002).
22. Id. at R. 3.3.
23. Id. at R. 8.4(c).
24. Id. at R. 1.0(f).
25. Gerald L. Shargel, Federal Evidence Rule 608(B): Gateway to the Minefield of
Witness Preparation, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1263, 1285 (2007).
26. Shockley v. State, 565 A.2d 1373, 1379 (Del. 1989); Shargel, supra note 25, at
1287; Brian Slipakoff & Roshini Thayaparan, The Criminal Defense Attorney Facing
Prospective Client Perjury, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 935, 942-43 (2002) (discussing the
knowledge requirement, and the gray area that lies between the two extreme
interpretations); Erin K. Jaskot & Christopher J. Mulligan, Witness Testimony and the
Knowledge Requirement: An Atypical Approach to Defining Knowledge and Its Effect on
the Lawyer as an Officer of the Court, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 845, 846 (2004)
(invocation of MODEL RULES, supra note 18, at R. 3.3 depends on the jurisdiction's
definition of knowingly).
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factual basis, 27 to a mere requirement that the attorney has a good
faith basis to believe." Professor Freedman argues that because
litigants in trial inevitably recreate the relevant events, the advocate's
duty is to construct a theory of what occurred which is in the client's
best interests.29 "The ethical distinction lies in whether the lawyer
assists the witness in developing the facts, or in creating them; the
former being permitted, the latter prohibited."" Therefore, lawyers
who unintentionally or unknowingly encourage false testimony may
not be directly regulated by the ethical rules. Professor Shargel
suggests that since the definitions of "knowingly" are so varied and
ill-defined, this standard encourages attorneys to remain ignorant.
As to Rule 8.4 (c) it is unclear what mental state is required.32
The rule itself does not use the word "knowingly" in defining the
violation. The courts that have addressed this rule have not been
consistent in their analysis. Courts have required knowledge,'
27. United States v. Long, 857 F.2d 436, 444 (8th Cir. 1988); United States ex rel.
Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977); Shargel supra note 26, at 1287; Riley
v. Carroll, 2007 WL 1795883 (D. Del. June 19, 2007) (referencing reasonable doubt
standard from Shockley, 565 A.2d 1373); Pennsylvania v. Alderman, 437 A.2d 36, 36 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1980); Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d 844 (D.C. 1979); Jaskot & Mulligan,
supra note 26, at 858 (stating the different knowledge standards that courts apply).
28. Illinois v. Bartee, 566 N.E.2d 855, 857 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Shargel, supra note 25,
at 1286; Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 781 N.E.2d 1237, 1247-48 (Mass. 2003) (stating
differing standards, the court applies the firm factual basis standard). See also Whileside
v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1328 (8th Cir. 1984) (applying the firm factual basis standard for
knowledge); Sanborn v. State, 474 So. 2d 309 (Fla. App. 1985); Brown v. Commonwealth,
226 S.W.3d 74, 81 (Ky. 2007) (affirming the firm factual basis standard); Jaskot &
Mulligan, supra note 26, at 858 (stating the different knowledge standards that courts
apply).
29. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM,
59-77 (1975); People v. Flores, 538 N.E.2d 481 (Ill. 1989); People v. Taggart, 599 N.E.2d
501 (Ill. App. 1992); Slipako & Thayaparan, supra note 26, at 944 (stating the different
standards that courts use to interpret knowledge); Jaskot & Mulligan, supra note 26, at 858
(states the different knowledge standards that courts apply).
30. See Applegate, supra note 1, at 303; Shargel, supra note 25, at 1264 (suggesting
that Freedman argues the duty to maintain client confidences trumps the duty of candor).
31. Shargel, supra note 25, at 1288.
32. Douglas Richmond, Lawyers' Professional Responsibilities and Liabilities in
Negotiations, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 249, 270 (2009); Philip L. Pomerance & Lisa D.
Taylor, Lawyers as Snitch or Saint: Do Client Confidences Stay Confidential?, AHLA
PAPER P07030210 (stating that there is no duty to investigate presumptively truthful
assertions a client makes).
33. Richmond, supra note 32. See Joseph Z. Fleming, E-Ethics, ALI-ABA Course of
Study, SR035 ALI-ABA 1479 (2010) (if Rule 8.4 were interpreted literally as applying to
any misrepresentation, regardless of the lawyer's state of mind or the triviality of the false
statement in question, it would render Rule 4.1 superfluous; also a different standard may
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reckless disregard," and even gross' or simple negligence."
Regardless of the standard applied, it is clear that the attorney's
motivation is irrelevant.38 Under the language of ABA Rule 8.4 (c),
the standard can be applied very expansively; it can apply to a
lawyer's activities that do not include the attorney even making a
statement." The ABA Rule can apply to dealings inside and outside
the courtroom and with any person.' However, the extensive
interruptions of this rule give it little practical guidance to the
practitioner.
Finally, the ABA Rules prohibit "conduct that is prejudicial to
the administration of justice." 4' This term is not defined in the ABA
Rules, and some have criticized the rule as vague and uncertain.42
apply to persons serving as mediators); William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The
Lawyer's Duty of Candor and the Bar's Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 243, 272 (stating the terms used in rule 84(c) are not defined in the rule).
34. Richmond, supra note 32 (citing Fla. Bar v. Mogil, 763 So. 2d 303, 309-11 (Fla.
2000)); In re Firstenberger, 878 N.E.2d 912, 913-914 (Mass. 2007); In re Skagen, 149 P.3d
1171, 1184 (Or. 2006); Sean Keveney, The Dishonesty Rule: A Proposal for Reform, 81
TEX. L. REV. 381, 382 (2002) (the language of rule 8.4 is broad and courts have not
adopted a consistent interpretation).
35. Richmond, supra note 32 (citing In re Ukwu, 926 A.2d 1106, 113-14 (D.C. 2007));
Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Discipline Bd. v Gottschalk, 729 N.W. 812, 818 (Iowa
2007); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Surrick, 749 A. 441, 445 (Pa. 2000).
36. Richmond, supra note 32 (citing Walker v. Supreme Court Comm'n On Prof 1
Conduct, 246 S.W.3d 418, 424 (Ark. 2007)); In re Skagen, 149 P.3d 1171 (Or. 2006); Fla.
Bar v. Riggs, 944 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 2006); In re Surrick, 338 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2003);
Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Jaseb, 773 A.2d 516, 522-23 (Md. 2001) (applying
the standard that false statements must be made intentionally; however, the court
recognizes that other jurisdictions use standards of reckless disregard).
37. Richmond, supra note 32 (citing in re Doughty, 832 A.2d 724, 734-35 (Del. 2003))
(Professor Richmond notes that this is a minority position).
38. Richmond, supra note 32. See also In Re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175 (Colo. 2002).
39. ANN. A.B.A. MODEL RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2007); In re Schneider,
553 A.2d 206, 209 (D.C. App.) (found deceit could violate the rule regardless of the intent
or motive); Richmond, supra note 32, (stating that the attorney's motivation is irrelevant
when evaluating conduct).
40. Richmond, supra note 32.
41. MODEL RULES, supra note 18, at R. 8.4.
42. In re Haws 801 P.2d 818, 822 (Or. 1990); Nancy Moore, Mens Rea Standards in
Lawyer Disciplinary Codes, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (2010); Donald T. Weckstein,
Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession, 48 TEX. L. REV. 267,
275-76 (1970); John F. Sutton, How Vulnerable is the Code of Professional Responsibility?,
57 N.C. L. REV. 497, 502 n. 13 (1979); Martha E. Johnson, Comment, ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility: Void for Vagueness?, 57 N.C. L. REV. 671, 689 (1979). But see
the following cases where the courts have upheld the constitutionality of the rule. In re
Rook, 556 P.2d 1351 (1976); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Bourne, 880 P.2d 360 (Okla.
1994); Howell v. State Bar Tex., 843 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding that the
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The rule has been used to address conduct that does not violate
another professional conduct rule but results in substantial injury to
the justice system.43 This rule sanctions conduct that resembles
obstruction of justice, including: advising a witness to testify falsely;
improperly paying a witness; refusing to respond to disciplinary
investigations, or repeatedly disrupting a proceeding.' The language
is straightforward but the difficulty is in determining the breadth of
the rule.45 The Oregon Supreme Court's examination of each of the
five key words in the rule is instructive.' The Court defined
"conduct" to include both acting improperly and failing to act when
required.47 The Oregon Court's rule also included any proceedings
"that contains the trappings of judicial proceeding, such as sworn
testimony, perjury sanctions, and subpoenas." 48  "Administration"
includes both effect of the lawyer's conduct on the proceedings and
disciplinary rule was not unconstitutionally vague because lawyers have the benefit of
guidance provided by "case law, court rules and the 'lore of the profession"').
43. Robert E. Juceam, Hypotheticals, Selected References on Ethics, and Selected
Excerpts from the New York Rules of Professional Conduct, 1768 PLI/CORP 505 (2009).
See Lawrence K. Hellman, When "Ethics Rules" Don't Mean What They Say: The
Implications of Strained ABA Ethics Opinions, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 317, 335 (1997)
(stating ABA rules are sometimes unsure of interpretation); Noah D. Stein, Prosecutorial
Ethics and the McNulty Memo: Should the Government Scrutinize an Organization's Payment
of its Employees'Attorneys' Fees?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3245, 3263 (2007) (recognizing that
many authors have opined that the rule is too vague, especially for prosecutors); Johnson,
supra note 42, at 684-85 (1979) (criticizing the rule against engaging in conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice on the grounds that it is too broad and too vague); Franklin
Strier, Making Jury Trials More Truthful, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95, 117 (1996) (pointing
out that the model rules, generally, do not provide much guidance).
44. People v. Chambers, 154 P.3d 419, 429 (Colo. 2006); In re Hallmark, 831 A.2d
366, 374 (D.C. 2003) (describing the conduct the rule prohibits as seriously interfering with
the justice system); Juceam, supra note 43; Douglas R. Richmond, Deceptive Lawyering,
74 U. CIN. L. REV. 577, 582-83 (2005).
45. Dodd v. Fla. Bar, 118 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1998); In re Haws 801 P.2d 818, 822 (Or.
1990).
46. Id.; Douglas R. Richmond, The Duty to Report Professional Misconduct: A
Practical Analysis of Lawyer Self-Regulation, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 175, 193-94
(1999) (mere potential harm to the justice system is sufficient).
47. Haws, 801 P.2d at 822.
48. Id. at 823; Richmond supra note 46 at 193-194 (conduct refers to errors of
commission and omission); In re Stauffer, 956 P.2d 967, 976 (Or. 1998) (discussing
identical language in DR 1-102(A), the court stated that the term "conduct" refers "to
doing something that a lawyer should not do, or failing to do something that a lawyer
should do"). Spradlin v. Ark. Ethics Comm'n, 858 S.W.2d 684, 692 (Ark. 1993) (citing
Haws, 801 P.2d 818).
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the substantive rights of any of the parties.49 The Court made it clear
that it is the potential prejudice on the proceedings that must be
assessed.o "Prejudice" includes repeated conduct that causes some
harm or a single act causing substantial harm to the administration of
justice." Therefore, an attorney might be disciplined for improper
witness coaching under this rule if it can be shown that the methods
used by the criminal attorney have a potential to harm the
proceeding. It would be helpful, therefore, to define for the criminal
attorney some of the methods that might fall under this rule.
Professor Silver noted "everyone knows that it is wrong to ask a
witness to lie. What is not known is how far a lawyer can properly
push a witness short of that."5 2 Since the ABA Rules do not speak
directly to the permitted or prohibited conduct of the lawyer when
preparing a witness, "there remains a vast realm of conduct that could
potentially be characterized as improperly seeking to influence a
witness' testimony. Within this area, there are very few guideposts to
assist the attorney in maximizing his effectiveness as an advocate
while still remaining within the recognized limits of professional
responsibility."53 Some will argue that "attorneys now have
essentially unlimited license to do almost anything in the process of
preparing witnesses short of buying witnesses or suborning perjury."54
Some courts have attempted to define proper witness
preparation to require more than merely refraining from encouraging
or aiding in perjurious testimony. For example, the court in State v.
McCormick defined proper witness preparation as "preparing the
49. Haws, 801 P.2d at 822. See also In re Conduct of Gustafson, 968 P.2d 367, 372
(Or. 1998) (using the three part test from Haws, and describing judicial proceedings);
Richmond supra note 46 at 193-94 (administration of justice refers "to procedural
functioning of a judicial matter or the substantive interests of a party"); In re Wyllie, 952
P.2d 550, 553 (Or. 1998) (discussing identical language in Model Code DR 1-102(A)).
50. Haws, 801 P.2d at 823 (citing In re Boothe, 740 P.2d 785 (Or. 1998) (holding an
attorney's unsuccessful attempt to induce a witness not to testify is prejudicial)). See also
In re Conduct of Gustafson, 968 P.2d 367, 372 ("Prejudice may arise from several acts that
cause some harm to the administration of justice or from a single act that causes
substantial harm to the administration of justice.") (citing Haws, 81 P.2d at 818); In re
Smith, 848 P.2d 612, 614 (1993).
51. Haws, 801 P.2d at 823.
52. Charles Silver, Preliminary Thoughts on the Economics of Witness Preparation, 30
TEX. TECH. L. REv. 1383, 1383 (1999). See also Richmond, supra note 46 at 193-94
(prejudice refers to even potential harm of the conduct). See In re Morris, 953 P.2d 387,
392 (Or. 1998) (discussing identical language in Model Code DR 1-102(A)).
53. See Piorkowski, Jr., supra note 10, at 389.
54. Gross, supra note 4, at 1137. See also Carter, supra note 2, at 468-469 (lists
objectives for witness preparation from Piorkowski, Jr.).
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witness to give the witness' [sic] testimony at trial and not the
testimony that the attorney has placed in the witness' [sic] mouth.""
In addition, the Eleventh Circuit in Crutchfield v. Wainwright defined
improper witness coaching as attempts to direct "a witness's
testimony in such a way as to have it conform with, conflict with, or
supplement the testimony of other witnesses." 6 The New York Court
of Appeals opined that the lawyer's "duty is to extract the facts from
the witness, not to pour them into him; to learn what the witness does
know, not to teach him what he ought to know.",7 However, the
simple axiom-that proper witness preparation helps the witness
understand "how" to testify, not "what" to testify about-is much
easier said than practiced.
III. Witness Preparation Guidelines in the
Criminal Justice Standards
Given than the ABA Rules do not specifically guide the
practitioner in appropriate witness preparation outside of the area of
knowingly suborning perjury, the Criminal Justice Standards might be
helpful in guiding the practitioner. The Criminal Justice Standards"
were first adopted in 1968. Chief Justice Warren Burger described
the Standards project as "the single most comprehensive and
probably the most monumental undertaking in the field of criminal
justice ever attempted by the American legal profession in our
national history."5 9  The ABA Criminal Justice Standards "are
intended to be used as a guide to professional conduct and
performance."60 Recently, the Criminal Justice Standards have been
undergoing a revision.
55. State v. McCormick, 259 S.E.2d 880,882 (N.C. 1979).
56. Crutchfield v. Wainwright, 803 F.2d 1103, 1110 (11th Cir. 1986).
57. In re Eldridge, 82 N.Y. 161, 171 (1880).
58. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION &
DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993).
59. Warren E. Burger, Introduction: The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, 12 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 251,251 (1974).
60. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.1
(Proposed Revisions 2010) [hereinafter "PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS"];
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-1.1 (Proposed Revisions
2010) [hereinafter "PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS"]; Rory K. Little, The Role of
Reporter for a Law Project, 38 Hastings Const. L.Q. 747 (Appendix: ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice: Proposed Revisions to Standards for the Defense Function) (2011)
[hereinafter Little, App.: Proposed Defense Standards].
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The ABA Standards of Criminal Justice contain three proposed
Standards that relate to witness preparation by prosecutors: Standard
3-4.2, "Relationship With Victims and Prospective Witnesses;"
Standard 3-4.3, "Relationship with Expert Witnesses;" and Standard
3-7.6, "Presentation of Evidence." There are four applicable
Proposed Defense Standards: Standard 4-3.3, "Interviewing Clients;"
Standard 4-4.4, "Relationship with Witnesses;" Standard 4-4.5,
"Relationship with Expert Witnesses;" and Standard 4-7.5,
"Presentation of Evidence." 61
Proposed Standard 3-4.2 contains ten prohibitions.6 2  The
Proposed Standard prohibits the prosecutor from paying a witness or
providing benefits to a witness that are not authorized by law or
might affect the witness's testimony. It prohibits interviewing alone a
criminally implicated witness. Additionally, Proposed Standard 3-4.2
requires a prosecutor to advise a witness about the witness's rights
against self-incrimination in order to inform, not to intimidate. The
Proposed Standard requires the prosecutor to respect the rights of
victims and witnesses, consult with them before making significant
decisions in the case, and provide appropriate information and
protection when necessary. Prosecutors should give witnesses notice
of when their presence is required. Finally, this Proposed Standard
prohibits an inappropriate relationship between the prosecutor and
victims or witnesses. All of the prohibitions deal with how the
prosecutor should interact with witnesses, but do not deal with what
the prosecutor should discuss with the witness.
Proposed Standard 3-4.3 deals with the relationship of the
prosecutor with the expert witness. 63 The Proposed Standard suggests
that before a prosecutor engages or offers an expert witness, the
prosecutor should evaluate the credentials, experience, and
reputation of the expert and investigate the scientific acceptance of
the expert's testing procedures and methods. The Proposed Standard
also requires the prosecutor to refrain from paying the expert
excessive fees that might influence the expert's testimony. The
Proposed Standard recommends that the prosecutor provide all
information to the witness that is necessary for a thorough and fair
opinion and warns the witness that his opinions and any documents
61. See Little, App.: Proposed Defense Standards, supra note 60.
62. PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 60, § 3-4.2; Little, App.:
Proposed Defense Standards, supra note 60.
63. PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 60, § 3-4.3; Little, App.:
Proposed Defense Standards, supra note 60.
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provided to him may be discoverable.' Finally, unlike the Standard
for lay witnesses, the Proposed Standard for expert witnesses
discusses what the prosecutor should discuss with the expert. The
Proposed Standard encourages the prosecutor to clarify that the role
of the expert in the courtroom is to be an impartial witness to assist
the fact finder, explain how the examination will be conducted, and
suggest likely impeachment questions that might be asked by
opposing counsel.
For the defense attorney, the Proposed Standards are equally
vague when looking for guidance on witness preparation. Proposed
Standard 4-3.3 deals with the criminal defense attorney interviewing
his client. The Proposed Standard encourages the attorney to share
with the criminal defendant all the available evidence and encourages
the client to be candid about all the facts that he knows.
Additionally, the Proposed Standard requires that the attorney
discuss with the client the "possible options and strategies ... without
seeking to materially limit the substance of the client's factual
responses."6  This last Standard infers limits on the criminal defense
attorney's methods in witness preparation.
Proposed Standard 4-4.4 deals with the relationship of the
criminal defense attorney to the prospective witnesses. 6  After
dealing with the prohibitions against compensating witnesses, the
Standard makes it clear that the defense attorney does not need to
advise witnesses as to their constitutional rights against self-
incrimination.67 Additionally, the Standard cautions against advising
witnesses not to speak to the prosecutor." No attempt is made in the
Standard to define what information or directions the defense
attorney should give the witness in preparation for trial.
Finally, Proposed Standard 4-4.569 is almost identical to Proposed
Standard 3-4.3. As described above, this is the only Standard that
64. PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 60, § 3-4.3; Little, App.:
Proposed Defense Standards, supra note 60.
65. PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 60, § 4-3.3(d); Little, App.:
Proposed Defense Standards, supra note 60.
66. PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 60, § 4-4.4; Little, App.: Proposed
Defense Standards, supra note 60.
67. PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 60, § 4-4.4(b) & (c); Little, App.:
Proposed Defense Standards, supra note 60.
68. PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 60, § 4-4.4(f); Little, App.:
Proposed Defense Standards, supra note 60.
69. PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 60, § 4-4.5; Little, App.: Proposed
Defense Standards, supra note 60.
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mentions what a criminal attorney should tell a witness about their
testimony. Additionally, Proposed Standard 4-7.5,7o dealing with the
presentation of evidence, is much like Proposed Standard 3-7.6 and
does not discuss the preparation of witnesses.
IV. Should These Witness Preparation Methods Be Regulated?
A. Interviewing Witnesses Together
A method used routinely by many prosecutors to prepare
witnesses, especially law enforcement witnesses, is to meet with all of
the witnesses at one time. Group preparation brings together all of
the witnesses to the relevant event. This method of witness
preparation saves time and allows all the witnesses to get a complete
picture of the events. Additionally, this method is the surest way to
avoid contradictions among the witnesses by assuring that each knows
what the other witnesses remember.
The possible ethical pitfalls in this method are obvious. The
lawyer may be telling the witnesses either directly or indirectly that
their testimony needs to be consistent. Thus, witnesses who may
remember the events differently may be convinced to change their
testimony to fit the other witnesses' perceptions. The lawyer will
likely not tell the witnesses to change their stories but will attempt to
"understand" the inconsistencies and in his or her conversation may
in fact be encouraging false testimony. Of course, the written reports
of the witnesses will allow the opposing counsel to cross-examine the
witnesses on any inconsistencies, but many times the details that are
"lined up" may not have even been in the report." Even when the
lawyer emphasizes that the witnesses must rely on their own
memories of the events, the pressure to conform testimony to the
other witnesses' stories and eliminate contradictions is sometimes
overwhelming." Unlike the use of statements to refresh recollection,
preparing witnesses together is more likely to cause witnesses to be
70. PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 60, § 4-7.5; Little, App.: Proposed
Defense Standards, supra note 60.
71. See, e.g., United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1431 n.2 (6th Cir. 1986) (attorney
brought the witnesses together to "help each other remember exactly what happened, how
it happened, when it happened, and all the minor details.") (emphasis added).
72. Applegate, supra note 1, at 309 (stating that the problem occurs when a witnesses
actual memory is changed during witness preparation "by the witness or, possibly, by the
lawyer," many times the testimony will not be discredited "because the witness sincerely
believes the testimony is true.").
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influenced by other witnesses." After all, Professor Hodes asks, "how
do we know when the result of a session in the horse shed [with a
witness] is refreshing recollection, and when it is prompting
perjury?"7 4
The ABA Model Rules or Standards do not address this method
of preparing witnesses. The courts that have addressed group
preparation have merely discussed the use of information about the
meeting to cross-exam the witnesses and not the propriety of the
method. For example, in United States v. Ebens the Sixth Circuit
discussed a meeting between several witnesses." The defendants in
Ebens were charged with civil rights violations. The group meeting
was conducted by a civil rights activist who was not connected to the
prosecution, and it occurred after the state had prosecuted them but
before the federal case was tried. The session was recorded and one
of the witnesses was persuaded that he had heard racial slurs,
although he had denied it previously." The Sixth Circuit held that the
trial court erred in not allowing the defendants to introduce the
recording of the meeting in the trial."
B. Encouraging Changes in the Defendant's or Witness's Appearance
Routinely, in witness preparation the criminal attorney will
discuss with the witness how the witness should dress and act in court.
Most witness preparation manuals would suggest that this discussion
should be a central part of witness preparation. It is important that
the client or witnesses do not appear in court in a way that will
negatively affect the juror's consideration of the facts. This includes
wearing clothes that are respectful to the proceedings and appearing
clean and well-groomed. The trick is to encourage witnesses to look
like they respect the court without looking like they have been forced
73. Richard H. Underwood, Perjury! The Charges and the Defenses, 36 DUO. L. REV.
715, 780 (1998) (stating group preparation can result in a waiver of privilege and work
product); John G. Koeltl & Paul C. Palmer, Preparing a Witness to Testify, in 469
LITIGATION & ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, LITIGATION
9, 22 (Practicing Law Institute, 1993) (acknowledging that privilege claims may be more
difficult to sustain in the event of group preparation of witnesses).
74. W. William Hodes, The Professional Duty to Horseshed Witness-Zealously,
Within the Bounds of the Law, 30 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 1343,1349 (1999).
75. Ebens, 800 F.2d at 1430-31.
76. Id. at 1431.
77. Id. See also United States v. Townsley, 843 F.2d 1070, 1086 (8th Cir. 1988) (group
preparation of witnesses in which the attorney suborned perjury did not constitute
privileged communication).
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to dress in a manner that is inconsistent with who they are. Jurors
will be suspicious of a client or witness who looks like he just put on
someone else's clothes in order to fool the jury. It is therefore
expected that the defendant, victim, and witnesses will be "cleaned
up" for court.
However, can the "cleaning up" of a witness, victim, or
defendant go too far and actually violate the rules of professional
conduct? For example, in an identification case can the attorney
suggest to the defendant that he alter his appearance so that the
victim is unable to recognize him in court?78 Of course, there are
other ways to identify the defendant rather than in-court witness'
identification; however, the identification by the victim is usually a
dramatic and an expected part of the prosecution's case. The
questions become how far can the criminal attorney go in changing
the appearance of the defendant or victim and should the standards
address that issue.
C. Telling the Witness About the Factual and Legal Issues in the Case
In witness preparation, what and how much information should
be given to the witness is an important consideration. General
information about the proceedings is expected; however, how much
case specific information-factual and legal-should the witness be
told is subject to some debate. Some suggest that telling the witness
about the law that surrounds the case and the other witnesses'
testimony will help the witness understand what part their testimony
plays in the case as a whole. Specific information about the case can
also help the witness understand what facts are important and
relevant. For example, the lawyer may explain his theory of the case
and how the witness's testimony fits into the theory. He might discuss
the elements of the claim or charge and the facts that tend to prove
these elements. Additionally, the witness and the lawyer may discuss
other testimony in order to prepare explanations for any
inconsistencies or in order to refresh the witness's own memory."
However, as one scholar noted:
78. For example, by shaving off his hair or dyeing it another color.
79. Stan Perry & Teshia N. Judkins, Ethical Witness Preparation: Stepping Back from
the Line for the Lecture, 48 Hous. LAW. 34 (2010) (a prohibition against informing a client
on the law is not practical; ethical rules require lawyers to inform clients of legal rights and
obligations and in preparing witnesses they should be informed so they may understand
what is relevant); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468,
500 (1990) (stating some lawyers believe you must inform a client in order to best
represent them); Wydick, supra note 7, at 26; Applegate, supra note 1, at 300-01
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[A]rming the client with pertinent legal information and
trusting the client to make good and legitimate use of it
demonstrates loyalty and zealousness. Recognizing that at
some point a loyal servant can be manipulated into becoming
an accomplice in crime is honoring the bounds of law. And
knowing how to flirt with that boundary line but not cross over
it is true professionalism.8
This is an important line that must be drawn when considering what
information should be imparted to the defendant, victim or witness.
Clearly the disclosure of case-specific information has the
potential to influence the witness to testify falsely. Explaining to the
witness or defendant the law, theory, or other evidence can encourage
them to change their testimony to fit the advocate's theory of the
case. Most lawyers are familiar with the infamous scene from the
movie "Anatomy of a Murder," in which a criminal defense lawyer is
defending a man charged with murdering his wife's rapist. The
attorney explains the legal importance of the time between the rape
and the murder. Subsequently the defendant adapts his story to
buttress the defense.
Additionally, supplying information regarding other evidence
and testimony can affect the witness's assessment of his recollection;
the witness may in fact begin to intentionally or unintentionally to
incorporate other witnesses' testimony into is his own. Further, the
sharing of other witnesses' testimony could cause a witness to become
more positive in his testimony than his own memory or observations
would justify. Professor Shargel raises an interesting question in
witness preparation when he discusses whether an attorney should
tell his client about the limitations on proof contained in Federal Rule
608.' He states that this information could cause a client to deny the
existence of a "prior bad act of untruthfulness," knowing that the
opposing counsel will be unable to prove it under the collateral
evidence rule. Professor Shargel believes that informing the client
(discussing the law with your client is important but it may have less attractive points as
well, such as shaping testimony).
80. Hodes, supra note 74, at 1349.
81. Albert W. Alshuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors & Trial Judges, 50
TEX. L. REv. 629, 638 (1972); Perry & Judkins, supra note 79 (describes "Anatomy of a
Murder"). See also J. Alexander Tanford, The Ethics of Evidence, 25 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 487, 533 (2002) (provides the dialogue between the lawyer and client from
"Anatomy of a Murder").
82. Shargel, supra note 24, at 1267.
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assists him in protecting himself against cross-examination. Since the
ABA Rules only prohibit an attorney from knowingly assisting a
client to commit perjury, some argue that zealous representation
requires this information to be given to the client." The Criminal
Justice Proposed Standard 4-3.3 hints that a criminal attorney should
be careful not to "materially limit the substance of the client's factual
responses" by discussing the alternatives and strategies of the case."
D. Preparing Witnesses after a Sequestration Order
The court, pursuant to section 615 of the Federal Rule of
Evidence," can order that all witnesses, except those specifically
delineated in the rule, are excluded from the court and prohibited
from discussing their testimony with other witnesses. The purpose of
this rule is to prevent witnesses from tailoring their testimony to be
consistent with other witnesses that have already testified.8 Witness
sequestration is commonly used because it "effectively discourages
and exposes fabrication, inaccuracy, and collusion."a However, the
standard sequestration order does not preclude the attorney from
discussing previous testimony with witnesses that have not yet
testified.'
83. Id.
84. See supra text accompanying note 65.
85. Fed. R. Evid. 615 states:
At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear
the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order of its own motion. This rule
does not authorize exclusion of (1) a party who is a natural person, or (2) an officer or
employee of a party which is not a natural person designated as its representative by its
attorney, or (3) a person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the
presentation of the party's cause, or (4) a person authorized by statute to be present.
86. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 2, at 465-67.
87. Id. at 465 (citing United States v. Famham, 791 F.2d 331, 335 (4th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Rhynes, 218 F.3d 310, 317 (4th Cir. 2000)). See also Matthew M.
Valcourt, Rule 615-Beyond the Walls of the Courtroom Proper: Efficacious Truth-Seeking
Device or Toothless Tiger?, 10 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 115, 116 (2005) (the
goal of witness sequestration is to prevent witnesses from tailoring their testimony to prior
witnesses and to aid the fact finder in determining the truth); Kurtis A. Kemper, Exclusion
of Witnesses Under Rule 615 of Federal Rules of Evidence, 181 A.L.R. FED. 549, 549 (2002)
(Rule 615 is intended to "discourage and expose fabrication, inaccuracy, and collusion and
to minimize the opportunity that each witness will have to tailor testimony to the
testimony of other witnesses.").
88. Rhynes, 218 F.3d at 317; United States v. Buchanan, 787 F.2d 477, 485 (10th Cir.
1986). See also Carter, supra note 2, at 465; Sarah Chapman Carter, Exclusion of Justice:
The Need for a Consistent Application of Witness Sequestration Under Federal Rule of
Evidence 615, 30 U. DAYTON L. REV. 63, 67-68 (2004); United States v. Sepulveda, 15
F.3d 1161, 1176 (1st Cir. 1993) (a bare sequestration order does not extend to beyond the
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Although attorneys are permitted to speak to witnesses after the
court has sequestered the witnesses, a criminal attorney must consider
the effect of sharing that information. This method of witness
preparation can be even more persuasive to the witness in
encouraging the witness to change the witness's testimony to fit the
other witnesses' testimony. There are no guidelines as to how far an
attorney can go in preparing witnesses after the trial has begun. The
question remains whether there should be even more restrictions at
this stage of the proceedings in light of the opportunity for abuse.
E. Do Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys Have Different Roles in
Witness Preparation?
In discussing ethical responsibilities in the criminal context, the
question always arises whether the ethical duties of the prosecutor
should mirror that of the criminal defense attorney. In dealing
directly with the criminal defendant, there arise issues of witness
preparation that do not arise for the prosecutor. Clearly, the criminal
defendant is entitled to more information about the case and the legal
options than is an ordinary witness or victim. Additionally, the
defendant is entitled to testify in his defense-regardless of the
attorney's opinion. Finally, the constitutional issues regarding the
defendant's Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of
Counsel may involve rights of the client that are not implicated for
the prosecutor. However, some might argue that when it comes to
the requirements of the attorney to avoid unknowingly encouraging
false testimony, the criminal defense attorney has the same duties as
an officer of the court.
Furthermore, should preparation of witnesses, who are not the
defendant, differ for the defense attorney and prosecutor? In many
respects the Criminal Justice Standards that are currently proposed
do not differ significantly for defense attorneys and prosecutors. The
question that must be considered is whether the prosecutor's duty as
a minister of justice creates a responsibility that exceeds the criminal
defense attorney's. Or rather, as officers of the court, they both share
courtroom); United States v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1227, 1235 (8th Cir. 1978) (sequestered
witnesses may communicate outside the courtroom unless specifically ordered not to);
United States v. Feola, 651 F. Supp. 1068, 1130 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), affd without opinion, 875
F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1989) (sequestered witnesses are free to discuss testimony outside of the
courtroom, both before trial and after testifying, but may be cross-examined about such
conversations if they tend to impact the witness's credibility or show bias).
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the same duties to avoid assisting in false testimony regardless of their
intent.
V. Proposed Standards on Witness Preparation'
The current proposed Standards do not include any guidance on
witness preparation. Therefore, the American Bar Association's
Criminal Justice Section should consider including guidelines in the
fourth edition of the Criminal Justice Standards that direct the
criminal attorney to avoid conduct that may not be intended to
influence the witness to testify falsely, but which by its nature may
have the potential to create false testimony. A standard should be
included in both the Prosecution Function as well as the Defense
Function. The standard for witness preparation could be included in
the sections on the relationship with victims and witnesses contained
in both the Prosecution Function (Standard 3-4.2) and the Defense
Function (Standard 4-4.4). However, it might be more effective to
put the Standard immediately following all the standards on the
relationships with the variety of participants so that it is clear that
witness preparation includes all witnesses regardless of their
relationship with the case.
The standards for prosecutors and defendants should be very
similar. In the preparation of witnesses, there is really no ethical
difference between the obligations of the prosecutor and the defense
counsel. Differences between ethical obligations of prosecutors and
defense counsel naturally stem from the constitutional rights of the
defendant and the defense counsel's role in protecting those rights.
In the area of witness preparation, the constitutional rights of the
defendant are not implicated because no one would argue that the
defendant has a constitutional right to present false testimony in his
defense." The only difference between the standards is the
relationship the defense attorney has when preparing the defendant.
The standard should attempt to guide the practitioner by first
pointing out the need to refrain from behavior that, even if not
intended to produce false testimony, may in fact lead to false
testimony. Additionally, the standard should contain a list of
attorney conduct that could unintentionally produce false testimony.
89. These proposed standards were the result of the author attending two of the
Criminal Justice Standards Roundtables, those at Stetson University College of Law and
Pace University College of Law.
90. See Nix V. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 163 (1986).
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A proposed standard for the Prosecution Function might include the
following language:
When preparing a witness to testify, whether at trial, deposition,
grand jury hearing, or any other hearing, a prosecutor should
refrain from any conduct that may intentionally or
unintentionally encourage, assist, or request a witness to testify
falsely. In considering how to prepare a witness to testify, the
prosecutor should consider whether the method the prosecutor
is using unintentionally conveys to the witness that he or she
should testify to facts other than what the witness, individually,
believes to be true. The prosecutor should not:
1. discuss with a witness the law or defenses in the case before
obtaining the witness's complete statement. Even after the
witness has given a complete statement, in writing or orally, the
prosecutor should not attempt to influence the witness's
testimony by explaining the defendant's theory of what
happened or the requirements of the law.
2. in a case in which identity is an issue, disclose to a witness
any information about the current appearance of the defendant,
unless extraordinary circumstances would require it.
3. prepare two or more witnesses together unless extraordinary
circumstances would require it.
4. after the court has ordered sequestration of witnesses,
disclose to a witness what previous witnesses have testified
about. This would not preclude a prosecutor from asking about
factual issues that have arisen based on the testimony of other
witnesses but the prosecutor should not imply that other
witnesses have testified differently than what the witness has
previously indicated he or she would testify about.
A proposed standard included in the Defense Function might
state:
When preparing a witness, other than the defendant, to testify
whether at trial, deposition, or any other hearing, defense
counsel should refrain from any conduct that may intentionally
or unintentionally encourage, assist, or request a witness to
testify falsely. In considering how to prepare a witness to
testify, defense counsel should consider whether the method
counsel is using unintentionally conveys to the witness that he
or she should testify to something other than what the witness,
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individually, believes to be true. The defense attorney should
not:
1. discuss with a witness, other than the defendant, the law or
the prosecution's theory of the case before obtaining the
witness's complete statement. Even after the witness has given
a complete statement, in writing or orally, defense counsel
should not attempt to influence the witness's testimony by
explaining the prosecution's theory of what happened or the
requirements of the law.
2. prepare two or more witnesses, excluding the defendant,
together unless extraordinary circumstances would require it.
3. after the court has ordered sequestration of witnesses,
disclose to a witness what previous witnesses have testified
about. This would not preclude defense counsel from asking
about factual issues that have arisen based on the testimony of
other witnesses, but defense counsel should not imply that other
witnesses have testified differently than what the witness has
previously indicated he or she would testify about.
Conclusion
The issues surrounding witness preparation in the criminal
context are numerous and complicated. Professional guidance is
needed in this area of trial practice, which is routinely practiced but
rarely addressed. The current Criminal Justice Standards do not
currently provide the necessary guidance. Therefore, standards
should be drafted to address the important gray areas of witness
preparation to assist attorneys to navigate an ethical path.
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